The desktop sidecar can bind on LAN addresses for phone access, so the H5 settings switch must be an authorization boundary for remote capability routes, not only a token-mode toggle. Remote browser API, proxy, websocket, and SDK routes now fail closed while H5 is disabled; local desktop, Tauri, WebUI, adapter, and internal SDK paths remain tokenless. When H5 is enabled, remote API, proxy, and websocket requests must use the H5 token carried by the QR link, and the server API key cannot substitute for that H5 token.
Constraint: Desktop sidecar binds 0.0.0.0 while reporting loopback to local UI.
Constraint: Client-controlled Host and Origin headers cannot prove a local request; the boundary uses Bun requestIP instead.
Constraint: Static H5 shell and /health must still load so browser bootstrap can show a recovery flow.
Rejected: Trust loopback Host headers | LAN clients can spoof Host and Origin.
Rejected: Use ANTHROPIC_API_KEY as a remote H5 credential | it is not the phone pairing token and would weaken the QR-token boundary.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not make h5Enabled=false an open remote state for /api, /proxy, /ws, or /sdk routes.
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-policy.test.ts src/server/__tests__/h5-access-auth.test.ts src/server/middleware/cors.test.ts
Tested: bun run check:server
Remote browser access needs an explicit path that preserves localhost desktop behavior while allowing H5 tokens for REST and client websocket upgrades. This keeps the existing synchronous Anthropic auth helper intact, adds async request validation for H5 tokens, and centralizes origin handling so preflight, API, proxy, websocket, and health responses behave consistently.
Constraint: Existing validateAuth(req) must stay synchronous for current tests and callers
Constraint: Default localhost and Tauri desktop behavior must remain unchanged
Rejected: Replacing validateAuth with an async-only API | would break existing sync tests and call sites
Rejected: Allowing wildcard or fallback remote origins | violates the H5 explicit-origin security model
Directive: Restore ProviderService serverPort in server integration tests that call startServer with custom ports to avoid leaking global proxy runtime state
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-auth.test.ts --timeout 30000
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-service.test.ts src/server/__tests__/h5-access-api.test.ts src/server/__tests__/settings.test.ts --timeout 30000
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-auth.test.ts src/server/__tests__/conversation-service.test.ts src/server/__tests__/cron-scheduler-launcher.test.ts --timeout 30000
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/e2e/full-flow.test.ts --timeout 30000
Not-tested: Full non-live server gate end-to-end; an attempted broader run was interrupted after uncovering and then fixing a test-side ProviderService port leak
Add complete server-side implementation for the Claude Code Desktop App UI:
- REST API: sessions, conversations, settings, models, scheduled tasks,
search, agents, and status endpoints (9 modules, 30+ endpoints)
- WebSocket: real-time chat streaming with state transitions, ping/pong,
permission request forwarding, and stop generation support
- Services: sessionService (JSONL read/write, CLI-compatible),
settingsService (atomic writes), cronService, searchService (ripgrep),
agentService (YAML management)
- Middleware: CORS (localhost-only), auth, unified error handling
- Tests: 180 tests (unit + E2E + business flow), all passing
- Docs: PRD, UI design spec, server architecture design
Non-invasive: all new code under src/server/, no changes to existing CLI code.
CLI/UI data interop: reads/writes the same JSONL/JSON files as the CLI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
