Allow local browser origins such as 127.0.0.1, localhost, and ::1 to use the desktop server without H5 token flow, while keeping LAN and public origins behind H5 access rules. Also make Vite SPA healthcheck fallback to the default loopback backend and document scoped verification expectations.
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-policy.test.ts
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-auth.test.ts
Tested: bun test src/server/middleware/cors.test.ts
Tested: cd desktop && bun run test -- src/lib/desktopRuntime.test.ts --run
Tested: git diff --check
Not-tested: bun run verify and coverage were intentionally skipped for this scoped local-dev fix.
Scope-risk: moderate
Complete the Electron replacement boundary before merging by removing the renderer-side Tauri host fallback, tightening H5/browser access so only desktop navigation is tokenless, and moving desktop release publication to a tag-driven GitHub Actions matrix with a single final publish job.
Constraint: H5/browser capability access must not gain tokenless access through localhost or retired Tauri origins
Constraint: Desktop release artifacts must be built by GitHub Actions from version tags, not treated as local build outputs
Rejected: Keep localhost browser origins trusted for convenience | local browser contexts can access loopback services and must use the H5 token path
Rejected: Publish from each matrix job | partial releases can be created before all platforms finish
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: broad
Directive: Do not reintroduce Tauri origins or localhost browser origins into the trusted desktop origin set without a reviewed security design
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-policy.test.ts src/server/__tests__/h5-access-auth.test.ts src/server/__tests__/diagnostics-service.test.ts src/server/middleware/cors.test.ts
Tested: bun test scripts/pr/release-workflow.test.ts scripts/release-update-metadata.test.ts
Tested: bun run check:desktop
Tested: bun run check:native
Tested: git diff --check
Not-tested: bun run check:server is blocked by expired quarantine entries server:cron-scheduler, server:providers-real, server:tasks, server:e2e:business-flow, server:e2e:full-flow
Introduce the Electron desktop shell alongside the existing React renderer and local Bun server boundary. The migration keeps the DesktopHost contract explicit across Tauri, Electron, and browser runtimes while adding Electron main/preload services for dialogs, shell, notifications, updates, tray/window lifecycle, terminal, preview WebContentsView, app mode, and release/package validation.
The commit also carries the latest local main desktop command updates, including agent slash entries and hidden-by-default markdown thinking details, so the packaged Electron build matches the current main UX surface.
Constraint: React renderer, local Bun server, REST/WebSocket, and sidecar boundaries must remain reusable during the migration
Constraint: macOS dev packages are ad-hoc signed and cannot prove Developer ID notarization or Gatekeeper release launch
Rejected: Browser-only smoke validation | it cannot exercise native dialogs, keychain prompts, notification behavior, or packaged app startup
Confidence: medium
Scope-risk: broad
Directive: Do not remove Tauri host support until signed Electron release artifacts pass native OS smoke on macOS, Windows, and Linux
Tested: bun run check:desktop
Tested: cd desktop && bun run check:electron
Tested: CSC_IDENTITY_AUTO_DISCOVERY=false bun run electron📦dir
Tested: bun run test:package-smoke --platform macos --package-kind dir --artifacts-dir desktop/build-artifacts/electron
Tested: Computer Use read packaged Electron app window at desktop/build-artifacts/electron/mac-arm64/Claude Code Haha.app
Not-tested: Developer ID signed/notarized Gatekeeper launch
Not-tested: Real OS notification click-to-session action
Not-tested: Windows and Linux packaged app smoke on real hosts
The H5 browser shell can load while deeper Settings tabs still exercise separate API routes. This adds MCP, plugin, and Agents endpoints to the H5 policy and integration matrices so the QR-token path is protected against page-level regressions.\n\nConstraint: H5 must expose existing desktop settings surfaces only after local opt-in and a valid H5 token.\nRejected: Rely on manual browser clicks alone | they missed the stopped-port failure mode and would not guard future regressions.\nConfidence: high\nScope-risk: narrow\nDirective: Add new Settings API surfaces to this H5 matrix when exposing them in the browser UI.\nTested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-policy.test.ts src/server/__tests__/h5-access-auth.test.ts\nTested: bun run check:server
The desktop sidecar can bind on LAN addresses for phone access, so the H5 settings switch must be an authorization boundary for remote capability routes, not only a token-mode toggle. Remote browser API, proxy, websocket, and SDK routes now fail closed while H5 is disabled; local desktop, Tauri, WebUI, adapter, and internal SDK paths remain tokenless. When H5 is enabled, remote API, proxy, and websocket requests must use the H5 token carried by the QR link, and the server API key cannot substitute for that H5 token.
Constraint: Desktop sidecar binds 0.0.0.0 while reporting loopback to local UI.
Constraint: Client-controlled Host and Origin headers cannot prove a local request; the boundary uses Bun requestIP instead.
Constraint: Static H5 shell and /health must still load so browser bootstrap can show a recovery flow.
Rejected: Trust loopback Host headers | LAN clients can spoof Host and Origin.
Rejected: Use ANTHROPIC_API_KEY as a remote H5 credential | it is not the phone pairing token and would weaken the QR-token boundary.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not make h5Enabled=false an open remote state for /api, /proxy, /ws, or /sdk routes.
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-policy.test.ts src/server/__tests__/h5-access-auth.test.ts src/server/middleware/cors.test.ts
Tested: bun run check:server
The classifier should not treat every /sdk path as trusted by pathname, because LAN-exposed servers already have a narrower local SDK trust boundary.
Constraint: Desktop local chat, Tauri WebView, loopback adapters, and local SDK routes must remain tokenless.
Rejected: Path-only /sdk trust | a non-local caller could reach the SDK route through a LAN-bound server.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep remote /sdk and hostile-origin loopback requests in the H5/browser bucket unless a dedicated SDK auth layer is verified.
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-policy.test.ts
Add a small standalone request classifier and focused server tests so later H5 token enforcement can target LAN/browser requests without changing the current desktop, SDK, or adapter paths.
Constraint: Task scope is limited to a standalone classifier plus tests in two server files
Constraint: Local desktop WebView, loopback integrations, and /sdk routes must remain tokenless for now
Rejected: Integrate the classifier into auth middleware now | this task only introduces the reusable classification seam
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep local-trusted and internal-sdk classifications tokenless unless the server auth integration changes with matching regression coverage
Tested: bun test src/server/__tests__/h5-access-policy.test.ts
Tested: per-file TypeScript diagnostics for src/server/h5AccessPolicy.ts and src/server/__tests__/h5-access-policy.test.ts
Not-tested: Full server auth middleware integration
Not-tested: bun run check:server remains red from pre-existing repo dependency and unrelated test failures
